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With the rapid change in technology, cooperative innovation based on data sharing has become an imminent tactic for enterprises
to gain competitive advantages. -is paper adopted a mixed method approach (case study-modelling-case study) to study firms’
co-opetition behavior based on their data analytics capabilities for innovation.We show that firms favor cooperation among peers
with same capabilities, i.e., when each firm’s data level is comparable to their partners.We further establish that data transferability
and incentive have high impact on cooperation decisions. Finally, we explain the evolution path of firms’ cooperation decisions
and discuss the best options for them to sustain long-term growth and competitiveness. -e results provide a basis for firms to
decide how best to utilize big data for collaborative innovation, so as to improve customers’ product adoption and reduce costs.
1. Introduction
-e rapid development of science and technology leads to
the accelerated upgrading of products and services. Enter-
prises must break through the homogenization of products
through innovation to maintain their survival and devel-
opment. Shorter product life cycles, rising expenditures on
R&D, and saturated markets are some of the biggest chal-
lenges companies are facing [1]. However, the high risk and
high investment of innovation make enterprises shy away
from product innovation [2], and the complexity and un-
certainty of product innovation make traditional enterprises
worry about their limited resources and capabilities [3]. In
this complex scenario, enterprises should not innovate in
isolation, at least not in an effective way [4]. In order to
overcome the limitations of a single enterprise, enterprises
have to break through the organizational limitations and
seek to cooperate with other enterprises in product inno-
vation [5]. Cooperative innovation has become the rational
choice of enterprises. Enterprises need to engage in coop-
eration to get access to other entities’ resources and capa-
bilities [6]. A growing literature supports the benefits of
cooperative innovation [7–10]. Recent studies highlight the
importance of information or knowledge sharing among
supply chain enterprises in cooperative innovation. For
example, enterprises with successful product innovation
characterized by a higher degree of novelty usually use a
wider range of knowledge sources to develop their products
[11]. Nonetheless, a sufficient degree of absorptive capacity is
required for effective learning in a collaborative agreement
between firms [12]. A firm is in a better position to scan and
utilize the external knowledge when their level of absorptive
capacity is high [13], acquired through collaborative inno-
vation networks, thereby increasing innovative capabilities.
In the era of digital economy, data resources become an
important strategic resource for enterprises. Massive data
utilization has changed the way of production and global
supply chain [14]. Data-driven business operations have
been the focus of many enterprises [15]. Many leading
enterprises (such as IBM, Cisco, and Huawei) have gathered
big data from their products and platforms to achieve
competitive advantage and profit growth. Leveraging the
value of big data will become the basis for competition for
today’s enterprises [16]. Hence, the ability of firms to ag-
gregate, elaborate, and analyse the data is becoming a key
competitive advantage [17]. Many researchers point out that
big data can improve business performance [18], effective-
ness in decision-making [19], the renewal of companies’
intangible assets [20], higher customer satisfaction [21], and
accelerating product/service innovation [22], for example,
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promote product upgrading by obtaining information re-
lated to existing products [23] and help enterprises in the
early stages of product development to determine customer
expectations of products [24]. In the information age, the
connotation of “data” began to expand, text, image, audio,
video communication, location, and others generated by
information technology was incorporated into the concept
of data [25]. In addition, big data may come from a variety of
sources, especially outside of firms. To use data in a better
way, it is necessary to share data with stakeholders [26].
On the other hand , externalities and hitchhiking often
occur in the process of knowledge sharing [27]. Due to the
asymmetry of the private information of the parties and the
incompleteness of the cooperation contract, bilateral moral
hazard exists objectively [28]. Members’ speculative be-
havior leads to the failure of cooperative innovation [29].
From the standpoint of maximizing their own interests, each
party of the cooperation takes the opportunistic behavior to
reduce the investment of its own specific assets or weaken its
own efforts, which makes it difficult to succeed in cooper-
ative innovation, especially when there is a competitive
relationship between the two parties of the cooperation.
Under the limitation of resource, competitors seek for
competitive advantages through appropriate resource
sharing and reasonable benefit distribution, thus making
competition and cooperation co-evolve, and finally forming
a dual relationship of both competition and cooperation
[30]. Due to the high time requirement of big data pro-
cessing and the small proportion of valuable data [31],
cooperative enterprises have to share data to improve the
success rate of innovation. However, data sharing loses its
unique right to data, and competitors’ opportunism will
cause great losses to the sharing party. How could firms
better cooperate with others to enhance their innovation
performance under the condition of sharing data? So far,
little is available in literature to address this. -is paper aims
to study how big data capabilities affect cooperative be-
haviors and decisions among co-opetition firms.
In this paper we adopted a mixed method (case study-
modelling-case study) to study the cooperative innovation
behaviors based on big data. Firstly, we reviewed literature to
provide the background of this study. After that, we use a
real case study to explain the motivation and challenges of
cooperation innovation based on big data and the impor-
tance of data analytics capabilities and incentive in decision-
making. -en, a model is proposed to analyse the cooper-
ation behaviour. Finally, a case study is conducted to verify
the results obtained from the model.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Big Data and Innovation. Big data has received con-
siderable attention from academics and practitioners in
recent years as a new top trend [21, 32–34]. Prior literatures
have made rich studies on innovation performance and the
influence factors. Many researchers point out that big data
makes significant influence on the firm’s innovation. For
example, big data could help firms acquire knowledge about
purchase behavior and market trends [22, 32]. With a large
amount of available data, firms can quickly exploit new
information to create and implement new knowledge and
ideas [33]. Data variety helps firms view innovation prob-
lems from different perspectives, which enables them to
develop new ideas better [34]. Compared with other big data
characteristics, data velocity plays a more important role in
improving firm innovation performance [35]. Real-time
data can help firms quickly develop new ideas and convert
them into innovative products before their competitors, so
firms need to quickly utilize information from integrating
and analysing big data to implement effective and efficient
innovation [36]. -e common finding from these studies is
that the ability of firms to aggregate, elaborate, and analyse
the data is becoming a key competitive advantage and re-
source [24, 37].
Based on this significant influence, some scholars paid
attention to the management and incorporation of big data
into innovation processes, known as big data analytics ca-
pability [38, 39]. In general terms, the related studies have
resulted into two development aspects. One of them is fo-
cused on tangible resources and infrastructure aspects, and
the efficient data management is achieved by means of a
more robust infrastructure adapted to the gigantic magni-
tudes of big data [38]. -is requires the firms undertake the
necessary investments to advance big data initiatives and
generate the yield that was set [40]. -e second line is as-
sociated with intangible resources and human aspects, which
is often also referred to as knowledge-based capital [41]. For
example, high levels of learning capacity enable the com-
bination and validation of knowledge extracted from big
data, rendering informed decision-making process [33]. Big
data technologies potentially lower the absorption costs of
external knowledge, i.e., the costs for identification, retrieval,
and exploitation of information [42]. -e adoption of data-
driven decision-making was particularly high in larger firms
and in firms with more skilled workers and a higher IT
capital stock [43]. Furthermore, some empirical studies also
proved the complementarity effects between investments in
infrastructure and intangible capital [41, 44, 45]. In this
context, the design and management of the big data capa-
bility is particularly relevant to the big data resources, which
implies paying attention to two dimensions: tangible
(available data volume and data variety) and intangible (data
culture, knowledge, and skilled labour).
2.2. Cooperative Innovation. Cooperative innovation has
increasingly attracted both researchers’ and practitioners’
attention as an appropriate solution to increased knowledge
intensity and the ever-increasing cost of R&D that it be-
comes progressively difficult for an individual firm to stay
creative and innovative in the long run [46]. Earlier studies
increasingly highlight the importance of collaboration with
different types of partners in enabling firms to develop
innovative products particularly through accessing tacit
knowledge [12]. In cooperative innovation, there are a lot of
researches on cooperation between different enterprises
types (see Table 1). In addition to utilizing internal resources,
enterprises will cooperate with industry leaders, suppliers,
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universities, and competitors. -e most prominent partners
for cooperation in the innovation process can be assigned to
vertical (supplier and customer), horizontal (competitors),
and institutional (universities and research institutes) sec-
tors [47]. With respect to performance outcomes of these
cooperation types, past research indicates that, cooperation
is beneficial for a firm [48]. In the case of vertical cooper-
ation, Tomlinson found evidence that the stronger the dy-
adic relations between vertical partners, the higher the
innovation success [49]. -is finding is in line with other
studies that focused on innovating and cooperating
throughout the supply chain [50, 51].
Besides vertical cooperation, working with competitors
(horizontal cooperation) received more attention lately. For
example, Peng et al. [52] as well as Luo et al. [53] ac-
knowledged that cooperating with competitors enhances
firm performance. In reference to these findings, two other
studies showed that the success of innovations jointly de-
veloped with a competitor also improves the ability to build
up trust with the partner [54, 55]. With respect to institu-
tional cooperation, Bozeman [56] as well as Vuola and
Hameri [57] examined universities and research institutes as
cooperation partners and found out that this kind of co-
operation plays an important role for the development of
technological innovations. As discussed above, past research
acknowledges the importance of cooperation with suppliers,
customers, and research institutes throughout the innova-
tion process for achieving innovation success. Although
there are many successful cases of cooperative innovation,
the success rate of cooperative innovation is not high. For
example, Reuer and Zollo conducted an empirical survey on
445 cooperation conducted by 262 enterprises in this period,
and the results showed that the results of innovation co-
operation were not satisfactory; only 15% were successful,
34% were unsuccessful, and 51% were interrupted [58]. At
the same time, De Man and Duysters reviewed and sum-
marized previous relevant studies from both theoretical and
empirical aspects and found that, in previous innovation
cooperation, cooperation failure rate was as high as 50%–
60% [59]. -e failure rate of innovation cooperation cases
among Chinese enterprises is as high as 50% [60]. -e re-
search results show that the advantages of cooperation al-
ways accompany the disadvantages.
Although there is no market competition between the
two parties, the expected cooperation results may not be
achieved. For example, in supply chain cooperation, both
firms can achieve win-win via cartelization if and only if
their contribution levels are Pareto matched [61]. Customer
participation can reduce the risk and uncertainty of R&D to
the greatest extent, but it has different effects in different
periods of new product development [7, 65, 66]. -e en-
terprise initiative of participating in the university-enter-
prise cooperation should be improved, and the scientific
research achievements from universities could not satisfy
enterprise's demands due to laying stress on the theory
excessively [67].-e effect of government-firm cooperation
is mainly influenced by relational trust [68]. On the other
hand , cooperation with market competition, co-opetition
strategy helps SMEs to develop their ability to effectively
pursue technological innovations [70]. But information
coming from competitors seems to have a negative influence
on the degree of novelty of innovation [71].
-ese results indicated that the cooperative innovation
behavior shows the dualism of competition and cooperation,
the cooperative relationship of cooperative innovation is
easy to break down, and the phenomenon of fighting alone is
still common. From the perspective of research content, less
studies considering about the role of big data capability in
the cooperative innovation process. We aim to fill this re-
search gap by posing the following relevant research
question: how to achieve the stability of cooperative inno-
vation relationship in the big data environment? However,
the existence of spillovers increases the opportunism ten-
dency of cooperative participants. It is important to consider
the effects of knowledge spillovers and absorptive capacity in
the cooperation innovation process.
2.3. Spillovers Effect and Absorptive Capacity. Knowledge
spillovers are a pervasive phenomenon [73]. Firms are often
able to obtain costless advantages from competitors’ inno-
vation activities [74]. According to the absorptive capacity
hypothesis, the degree to which firms benefit from knowledge
spillovers is largely dependent on investment in internal
knowledge [75]. Many studies have demonstrated that firms
that can effectively absorb external knowledge have better
innovation performance [76]. Firms with high absorptive
capacity could identify the value of external information and
apply the information into innovation activities [77–79].
Analogously, firms with high absorption would be able to
benefit more from knowledge spillovers than firms with low
absorptive capacity [80]. While knowledge spillovers increase
the diffusion speed of innovation, they also act as a disin-
centive to investment in innovation [74]. -e disincentive of
Table 1: Comparison of different cooperative partners.
Perspectives Main partner Related literature
No competition
Supplier [49–51, 61–63] Krause et al., 2007; Tomlinson and Philip, 2010; Jean et al., 2014; Zehui et al., 2014; Clausset al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016
Customer [7, 24, 64–66] Lau, 2011; Davide et al., 2015; Kaveh et al., 2016; Woojung, 2016; Tan et al., 2017
University
[20, 56, 57, 67] Barry, 2000; Olli et al., 2006; Wang and Liu, 2011; Secundo et al., 2017
Government [68, 69] Bosch et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2017
With
competition
Competitors
[52–55, 70–72]
Luo et al., 2006; Gnyawali et al., 2009; Anne, 2011; Tzu et al., 2012; Bouncken et al., 2012 and
2013; Van et al., 2018
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investment in R&D can be strong for innovators when
knowledge spillovers are high [81], as firms aim to reduce
research costs and may fear that opportunism will prevent
them from actively searching for and sharing new knowledge
[74, 82]. Firms will limit their new investments in innovation
if they see a decreased propensity to make exclusive use of the
results of such investment [83, 84].
Considering big data as an important approach to help
firms to maximize their innovation and efficiency [4, 37, 39],
it is important to understand how big data may impact on
the firms' absorptive capacities [85, 86] as well as contribute
to their success in promoting collaborative innovation.
Academic research and reviews related absorptive as a ca-
pability that can impact positively innovation performances,
but the influence of big data levels on absorptive capacity
remains ambiguous. -erefore, this article studies the co-
operative innovation in big data environment and explores
the capability's influence mechanism. Taken together, our
final research question is:How does the big data capability
levels influence the cooperation intention and maintain a
stable cooperative relationship? On this basis, suggestions
are put forward to improve the innovation performance,
which can provide reference for firms to make cooperative
innovation decisions.
3. Case Study
Enterprise S is an agent of computer hardware based in
Xiamen, China. Its business includes two aspects: selling
hardware equipment of upstream manufacturers and pro-
viding hardware-related services to consumers. Enterprise S
has been established for five years, and now, it has 13
employees. Its operating income reached 20 million yuan in
2018, and it has entered a high-speed growth period. -e
upstreammanufacturer of enterprise S is the industry leader,
and its product technology level is very high. However, the
upstream manufacturers mainly focus on designing and
producing products and not directly dealing with end
consumers. S serves as a missing link in the supply chain, i.e.,
selling and servicing manufacturers’ products to end con-
sumers. -rough providing products to after-sales service, S
collected huge customer data that are valuable for the up-
stream manufacturers. Due to the small size of enterprises,
low capacity of big data, and fierce competition in the in-
dustry, there are many agents competing with S for the same
product and service. According to statistics, there have been
more than 200 agents in Xiamen in 2018. Hence, the up-
stream manufacturers use incentives (discount, access to
resources, and technical support) to entice S or its competitors
to share data (of end users). In light of this, S considering
cooperation among its peers, however, data analytics capa-
bilities could be a big issue (SMEs lack resources and capa-
bilities of data analytics as compared to large firms).
In short, enterprises S tried to use big data to improve
product innovation and service but encountered many
problems, as follows: (1) although S has a huge numbers of
customers, the customers are in a wide range of industries
and the collected data are not complete or large enough; (2)
existing staff lack data analytics capabilities; (3) lack of trust
among supply chain members as well as from the upstream
manufacturers in terms of data sharing (S believes large
manufacturers only interested in its customers’ data).
In light of this, S tries to carry out cooperative innovation
with its peers. -e advantage of this is that they have data of
different customers in different industries, which can make
up for each other. Moreover, in the aspect of data analysis,
cost allocation can be carried out through cooperation and
joint establishment of research departments. However, data
transferability and incentive have high impact on cooper-
ation decisions. -ere are mistrust among partners as they
are competitors in the same market too. In addition, data
analytics capabilities among peers can have strong impact on
the cooperation decisions.
4. Model and Analysis
4.1. Models. In the process of collaborative innovation,
firms will display two strategies: competition and coop-
eration [87]. Competitors who are originally opposite to
each other under the limitation of resources (such as
exclusive customer data) seek for competitive advantages
through appropriate resource sharing and reasonable
profit distribution, so that competition and cooperation
can co-evolve and form a dualistic relationship of both
competition and cooperation.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each firm as a
partner can be the S or R. Cooperative innovation means
that the firms invest in the data acquisition or the big data
analysis, which ensures the acquired data knowledge could
transfer into the final innovation results. -e complete
process of cooperation includes the joint participation of
both sides. Big data capability is the data acquisition ability
or/and the analysis ability. -e willingness to share is the
premise to ensure the smooth progress of data sharing.
Based on previous studies, the willingness and data
capability of the firms, the data stock, and the transferability
of data into knowledge are the key elements of data resources
sharing in cooperative innovation.
Before presenting our model, we introduce some no-
tations as follows:
i : index of firms, i � s, r
ci : firm i’sinnovation investment for cooperative
Qi : firmi’s existing data stock
T : the marginal benefit when data are ultimately
transformed into corporate income
ei: firm i’ s innovation effort
φ : sharer’s effort level elastic coefficient− big data
capacibility
μ : reciever’s effort level elastic coefficient− big data
capacibility
β : cooperative innovation income distribution ratio
for firm s
Based on Cobb–Douglas cooperative production $
$function model [88], the output yield function is assumed
to be:
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Yi � TQie
φ
s e
μ
r + θ, (1)
where φ and μ also suggest the ratio of changes in knowledge
output during the entire acquisition and sharing process
when S or R increases their efforts. θ means exogenous
random variable that affects knowledge of cooperative
production, which obeys a normal distribution with a mean
of 0 and a variance of σ2, that is, θ ∼ N(0, σ2).
Furthermore, we assume the effort is quadratic in the
level of cost reduction. -at is, ci has to be paid to achieve a
cooperative innovation for firm i. -e actual income of the S
is equal to the remuneration obtained minus the data
sharing cost. Firm S’s expected income function is as follows:
ω � V πs( ) − C. (2)
-e maximized expected utility function of the other
party is equivalent to the maximized deterministic equiva-
lent income, and the expected utility function can be
replaced by deterministic equivalent income:
E(sharer) � βTQie
φ
s e
μ
r − cs. (3)
-e actual income of the R is the data sharing output
minus the remuneration paid to the S, and the expected
utility function is
E(receiver) � (1 − β)TQie
φ
s e
μ
r − cr. (4)
Assume that the probability of “cooperative strategy”
and “competitive strategy” adopted by the S is p and 1 − p,
respectively. -e probability of the R adopting “cooperative
strategy” and “competitive strategy” is q and 1 − q, re-
spectively. R refers to the benefits gained from the “coop-
erative strategy” adopted by one party and the “competitive
strategy” adopted by the other party. -is income indicates
that the partner enterprise shares necessary data, informa-
tion, and knowledge for the overall benefit, while the
competitor uses opportunities to form or strengthen its own
advantages without any sharing or investment. -erefore,
the degree to which competitors can turn R into their own
advantages depends on their own learning ability. Let the
learning ability of enterprise be xiE, respectively. Assume
that each game is played between these two firms, but such a
game will be repeated many times until the evolution of the
game strategy is stable. It is assumed that, due to the dif-
ferences in technology accumulation, knowledge stock, and
cooperation preference, the game process of cooperative
innovation is an asymmetric evolutionary game. -e pay-
ment matrix of the evolutionary game is shown in the
following Table 2.
-e expected revenue of cooperation for the S is
Es1 � q βT Qr + Qs( )e
φ
s e
μ
r − cs( ) +(1 − q) TQse
φ
s − cs( ).
(5)
-e expected revenue of competitive for the S is
Es2 � q TQs + xsTQre
μ
r( ) +(1 − q)TQs. (6)
-e average revenue function of S is
Es � pEs1 +(1 − p)Es2. (7)
-e expected revenue of cooperation for the R is
Er1 � p (1 − β)T Qr + Qs( )e
φ
s e
μ
r − cr( ) +(1 − p) TQre
μ
r − cr( ).
(8)
-e expected revenue of competitive for the R is
Er2 � p TQr + xrTQse
φ
s( ) +(1 − p)TQr. (9)
-e average revenue function of R is
Er � qEr1 +(1 − q)Er2. (10)
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, enter-
prises choose cooperation, there must be cooperation rev-
enue greater than competition revenue, and similarly, there
must be competition revenue greater than cooperation
revenue when they choose competition. -erefore, the cost
needs to meet the following conditions:
TQs e
φ
s − 1( )< cs < βT Qr + Qs( )eφs eμr − TQs − xsTQreμr ,
TQr e
μ
r − 1( )< cr <(1 − β)T Qr + Qs( )eφs eμr − TQr − xrTQseφs .
(11)
Next, we discuss equilibrium results through evolu-
tionary analysis.
5. Equilibrium Analysis
5.1. Equilibrium Points. According to the revenue matrix,
the replication dynamic equation of both sides can be ob-
tained as follows:
F(p) �
dp
dt
� p Es1 − Es( ),
F(q) �
dq
dt
� q Er1 − Er( ).
(12)
And then, we get a two-dimensional dynamical system:
F(p) � p(1 − p) Es1 − Es2( ),
F(q) � q(1 − q) Er1 − Er2( ).
{ (13)
When F(p) � 0, p∗ � 1, p∗ � 0, and q∗ � (cs − Qs
(e
φ
s − 1)T/T(Qse
φ
s (βe
μ
r − 1) − Qr(e
μ
rxs − e
φ
s β))). In the same
way, when F(q) � 0, q∗ � 1, q∗ � 0, andp∗ � (c r − Qr(eμr −
1)T/T(Qre
μ
r (e
φ
s (1 − β) − 1) − Qse
φ
s (xr − e
μ
r(1 − β))). To sim-
plify the problem, we can define the critical point as follows:
p0 �
cr − Qr e
μ
r − 1( )T
T Qre
μ
r e
φ
s (1 − β) − 1( ) − Qse
φ
s xr − e
μ
r(1 − β)( )( )
,
q0 �
cs − Qs e
φ
s − 1( )T
T Qse
φ
s βe
μ
r − 1( ) − Qre
μ
r xs − e
φ
s β( )( )
.
(14)
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According to the expression, we can find that when
xs < (β(Qr + Qs)eφs − Qseφs e− μr /Qr) and xr<((1 − β)(Qr +
Qs)e
μ
r − Qre
μ
re
− φ
s /Qs), 0<p0<1, 0<q0<1. So, (p0,q0) is also
an equilibrium solution.
Theorem 1. $e equilibrium solution of the evolutionary
game is (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), and (p0, q0).
5.2. Stability Analysis of Equilibrium Solution. According to
the system of differential equations proposed by Friedman
[89], the stability of the equilibrium solution can be obtained
by analysing the local stability of Jacobian matrix of the
system. -e Jacobian matrix of this dynamic system is
J �
zF(p)
zp
zF(p)
zq
zF(q)
zp
zF(q)
zq


. (15)
If the equilibrium solution satisfies the following two
conditions simultaneously, trJ � (zF(p)/zp) + (zF(q)/
zq)< 0 and det J � (zF(p)/zp) × (zF (q)/zq)− (zF(p)/
zq) × (zF(q)/zp) > 0. -en, the point is locally stable, and
the equilibrium solution is an evolutionary stability
strategy.
Situation 1. When xs > (β(Qr + Qs)eφs − Qseφs e− μr /Qr) and
xr > ((1 − β)(Qr + Qs)eμr − Qreμr e− φs /Qs), the equilibrium
solution (0, 0) is the only stable strategy of the system, (0, 1)
and (1, 0) are the saddle points, and (1, 1) is the labile point.
-e replicated dynamic diagrams for this situation are
shown in Figure 1. -is means that when both sides have
strong learning ability, enterprises are more inclined to
compete regardless of whether the other side chooses to
cooperate or not. -e reason for this is that, in the process of
cooperation, it is impossible to predict whether the other
party betrays or not, and a higher learning ability makes it
easier for the strong side to choose betrayal.-e risk of loss is
higher than the benefit of cooperation, so both choose not to
cooperate.
Situation 2. When xs < (β(Qr + Qs)eφs − Qseφs e− μr /Qr) and
xr < ((1 − β)(Qr + Qs)eμr − Qreμre− φs /Qs).
(I) Dynamic process analysis for enterprise S
When q � (cs − Qs(e
φ
s − 1)T/T(Qse
φ
s (βe
μ
r − 1) −
Qre
μ
r (xs − e
φ
s β))), any value of p guarantees a stable
state. When q<(cs − Qs(eφs − 1)T/T(Qs eφs (βeμr − 1)−
Qre
μ
r (xs − e
φ
s β))), p=0 and p=1 are stable states and
p=0 is the stable strategy. When q>(cs − Qs(eφs −
1)T/T(Qse
φ
s (βe
μ
r − 1) − Qre
μ
r (xs − e
φ
s β))), p=0 and
p=1 are stable states and p=1 is the stable
strategy. Figure 2 describes the dynamic diagram
and equilibrium state of p under three values
conditions.
(II) Dynamic process analysis for enterprise R
When p � (cr − Qr(e
μ
r − 1)T/T(Qre
μ
r (e
φ
s (1 − β) −
1)− Qse
φ
s (xr − e
μ
r (1 − β)))), any value of q guar-
antees a stable state. When p> (cr − Qr
(e
μ
r − 1)T/T(Qre
μ
r (e
φ
s (1 − β) − 1) − Qse
φ
s (xr − e
μ
r
(1 − β)))), q= 0 and q= 1 are the stable states and
q= 1 is the stable strategy. When p< (cr − Qr(eμr −
1)T/T(Qre
μ
r (e
φ
s (1 − β) − 1) − Qse
φ
s (xr − e
μ
r (1−
β)))), q= 0 and q= 1 are the stable states and p= 0 is
the stable strategy. Figure 3 describes the dynamic
diagram and equilibrium state of q under three
values conditions.
In this situation, both (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the stable strategy
of the system, (p0, q0) is the saddle point, and (0, 1) and (1, 0)
are labile points. So the firms act together, one chooses to
cooperate, and the other will cooperate. But the strategy that
the system ultimately chooses to achieve equilibrium depends
on the initial state of the system. -e replicated dynamic di-
agram of the system is shown in Figure 4.
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 1)
(1, 0)
p
q
Figure 1: -e replicated dynamic diagrams for Situation 1.
Table 2: -e payoff matrix of the coopetition game.
Firm R
Cooperation (q) Competitive (1 − q)
Firm S
Cooperation (p) βT(Qr + Qs)e
φ
s e
μ
r − cs TQse
φ
s − cs
(1 − β)T(Qr + Qs)e
φ
s e
μ
r − cr TQr + xrTQse
φ
s
Competitive (1 − p) TQs + xsTQre
μ
r TQs
TQre
μ
r − cr TQr
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-e result of this situation analysis indicates that when
both enterprises have a low learning ability, both parties
choose to cooperate and gain higher profits than they choose
to steal big data knowledge. However, when one party
chooses to betray, the loss of the other party is higher than
the profit of cooperation, so both of them have to cooperate
or choose the competitive strategy.
6. Evolutionary Stability and Discussion
According to the above equilibrium analysis results, A and B
(in Figure 4) are labile points, E is the saddle point, and O
and C are evolutionarily stable states (ESS). When the initial
state of the game is in the regional OAEB, the strategies of
enterprises will evolve to point O and eventually form a
stable state where firms adopt competitive strategies. On the
contrary, when the initial state of the game is in EACB, the
strategy of the enterprise will evolve to point C and finally
form a stable state where firms adopt cooperation strategy.
-is indicates that the area of OAEB and EACB will affect
the evolution result of collaborative innovation, and the trust
of firms’ cooperation preference to each other will play a
positive role in the evolution of cooperative innovation
strategy. When SOAEB = SEACB, the probability of both sides
adopting cooperation or competition strategy is equal; when
SOAEB> SEACB, the probability of both sides adopting
competition strategy is higher than cooperation; when
SOAEB< SEACB, the probability of both sides adopting co-
operation strategy is higher than competition. -e area of
regions I and II is related to effort level, big data capability,
distribution ratio, transferability of data, data stock, learning
ability, and cost.
Since SOAEB + SEACB � 1, the influence of the same pa-
rameter on the area of two regions is reversed, so only one of
them need to be analyzed. Next, we analyse the influence of
parameters on SOAEB:
SOAEB �
1
2
cs − Qs e
φ
s − 1( )T
T Qse
φ
s βe
μ
r − 1( ) − Qre
μ
r xs − e
φ
s β( )( )
+
cr − Qr e
μ
r − 1( )T
T Qre
μ
r e
φ
s (1 − β) − 1( ) − Qse
φ
s xr − e
μ
r(1 − β)( )( )
( ). (16)
In the process of cooperative game, the stability strategy
of an enterprise is closely related to the change in various
factors. -e following analysis is carried out on the factors
affecting the enterprise strategy.
0
1
p
(a)
0
1
p
(b)
0
1
p
(c)
Figure 2: -e replicated dynamic diagrams for firm S.
0
1
q
(a)
0
1
q
(b)
0
1
q
(c)
Figure 3: -e replicated dynamic diagrams for firm R.
A (0, 1)
O (0, 0)
C (1, 1)
B (1, 0)
I
II
q
p E (p0, q0)
Figure 4: -e replicated dynamic diagrams for system.
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6.1. Transferability of Big Data
Theorem 2. For the transferability of data into knowledge,
higher transferability makes a higher probability of firms
choosing cooperation.
Proof. Take the derivative of T with respect to SOAEB, and
we can get (zSI/zT) is less than 0when everything else stays the
same. (zSI/zT) � (1/2T2) ((cr/Qre
μ
r + e
φ
s (Qsxr − (Qr +
Qs)e
μ
r (1 − β))) + (cs/Qre
μ
r xs + e
φ
s (Qs − (Qr + Qs)e
μ
rβ))), ac-
cording to the assumptions of cr and cs, we can get Qre
μ
r +
e
φ
s (Qsxr − (Qr + Qs)e
μ
r(1 − β))< 0 and Qreμr xs + eφs (Qs −
(Qr + Qs)e
μ
rβ)< 0, so (zSOAEB/zT)< 0, then (zSOAEB/zT)> 0
-is indicates that the higher the value density of big data
owned by enterprises, the higher the data transferability and
easier to cooperate with other firms. With the improvement in
data utilization, enterprises are more willing to share data with
partners and further analyse and process the data.
6.2. Big Data Stock
Theorem 3. For the big data stock, a higher stock makes a
higher probability of firms choosing cooperation.
Proof. Same as before, take the derivative of Qr andQs with
respect to SOAEB, we can get (zSI/zQs)< 0(zSI/zQr)< 0
when everything else stays the same, so
(zSEACB/zQs)> 0 (zSEACB/zQr)> 0. It indicates that, with
the increase in enterprise data stock, the probability of
enterprise implementing cooperative strategy is greater. On
the one hand, the more data an enterprise has, the more
likely it is to acquire more knowledge. As data sharing
activities between enterprises and partners continue to in-
crease, their own data stock will also increase. Meanwhile,
the higher data stock imposes higher costs of storing and
analysing, and more enterprises are inclined to share
through cooperation. -erefore, the accumulation of en-
terprise data stock and the implementation of cooperation
strategy between enterprises are mutually reinforcing each
other.
6.3. Learning Capability
Theorem 4. For the learning capability, there must be a
critical value of learning capability that makes cooperation
break down.
Proof. According to the first derivative, we can get
(zSI/zxs)> 0 (zSI/zxr)> 0 and (z2SI/zx2s )>0(z2SI/zx2r)<0.
It means the probability of cooperation decreases strictly
with the increase in both parties’ learning capability.
According to -eorem 1, when xs>(β(Qr + Qs)eφs −
Qse
φ
s e
− μ
r /Qr) and xr>((1 − β)(Qr+ Qs)eμr − Qreμre− φs /Qs), both
sides choose to complete. -erefore, cooperation can only
be realized when the learning capability of both parties
is below the critical point, and the probability of cooper-
ation increases with the decrease in learning capability.
Knowledge spillovers in the process of cooperation will
result in the loss of hidden knowledge income. With the
increase in communication between enterprises and the
improvement of learning ability of cooperative partners,
the probability of knowledge theft will be further increased,
the probability of knowledge loss will also increase, and the
willingness of enterprises to cooperate will be reduced.
6.4. Big Data Capability
Theorem 5. For the big data capability, a higher capability
makes a higher probability of firms choosing cooperation, and
firms favor cooperation among peers with same capabilities.
Proof. Same as before, we can get (zSI/zφ)< 0 and
(zSI/zμ)< 0, so (zSEACB/zφ)> 0 and (zSEACB/zμ)> 0.
-erefore, the cooperation probability increases with the big
data capability of both parties. -e convexity of monotone
function can be obtained by the second derivative.
According to the first derivative, we can get the second
derivative has an inflection point φ∗; when
φ<φ∗,(z2SII/zφ2)> 0, and whenφ>φ∗,(z2SII/zφ2)< 0. In
addition, we take the derivative of μ with respect to zSII/zφ
and get (z2SI/zφzμ)< 0 is always true. So we get the graph of
SEACB with respect to φ and μ, as shown in Figure 5.
When the big data capability of firm S is stronger and the
big data capability of the other party is weaker, the probability
of cooperation between the two parties is higher (i.e., the circle
node in Figure 5).-is is because when the firm has a stronger
ability, the other party is more willing to cooperate with it.-e
more confident the firm is about the probability of the other
party choosing to cooperate, the higher confidence guarantees
to be favorable to cooperation. When the enterprise has a
weaker ability, the more difficult it is to ensure the other party
is willing to cooperate. Similarly, enterprise R expects such a
situation. Both sides expect high data capability, but big data
capability is the elasticity coefficient of efforts, which is be-
tween 0 and 1. After repeated games, both companies tend to
be in the middle. In addition, when one's own capability is
weak and the other’s capability is also weak, it is easy to reach
cooperation (i.e., the square node in Figure 5). When each
firm’s data capability is strong, it is also easy to reach
cooperation (i.e., the strong union). -is is because both
sides data capability are comparable to their partners and
more willing to cooperate. -at is, firms with similar ca-
pabilities are more willing to cooperate.
6.5. Optimal Distribution Coefficient
Theorem 6. Keeping other factors unchanged, there is an
optimal distribution coefficient β that maximizes the prob-
ability of both enterprises adopting cooperative strategies.
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Proof. According to the first derivative,
zSI
zxs
�
Qr + Qs( )e
μ
re
φ
s
2T
cr − Qr e
μ
r − 1( )T
Qse
φ
s xr − e
μ
r (1 − β)( ) + Qre
μ
r 1 − e
φ
s (1 − β)( )( )
2 −
cs − Qs e
φ
s − 1( )T
Qse
φ
s e
μ
rβ − 1( ) − QrRμ xs − e
φ
s β( )( )
2
 . (17)
So, cooperative probability S is not a monotonic function
of distribution coefficient β. -en, we can get the second
derivative (z2SI/zφ2)> 0 is always true. -is means there
must be a minimum value for SI, where the cooperative
region has a maximum value. We can get the optimal
distribution coefficient β∗ by solving the equation
(zSI/zxs) � 0. When β � β
∗, the probability of firms’ co-
operative innovation strategy converging to C is the
largest.
Theorem 7. $e distribution coefficient is positively corre-
lated with firm’s capability to learn big data knowledge from
rivals; that is, stronger learning capability makes higher
distribution coefficient.
Proof. According to the first derivative, we get
(zβ∗/zxs)> 0 (zβ∗/zxr)> 0. It can be found that the dis-
tribution coefficient is an increasing function of the firm’s
learning capability, and the stronger the firm’s learning
capability is, the higher the income distribution ratio it
obtains. -is is because in the cooperative innovation
process of firms, the stronger the learning ability is, the more
likely the betrayal will be. -e other party can only ensure
the non-betrayal of the partner by improving the income
distribution of payment, but when the learning ability ex-
ceeds the critical value, neither party will choose to
cooperate.
According to the model results, big data affects the
cooperative innovation behavior of enterprises from two
aspects:
(1) -e basic characteristics of big data have a positive
impact on the cooperative behavior. If participants
shared data have high value density and stock, the
stronger the willingness of the other party to par-
ticipate in the cooperation, the more the cooperation
process tends to be stable and effective. In this sense,
the results suggest that it is easier to achieve
cooperation in the big data environment. -is co-
operative process is more effective since it allows to
make decisions related to the characteristics of the
new product on massive data and not only on the
experience of the actors participating, and this
considerably reduces the risk associated with the lack
of acceptance of the products by the end customer.
-e efficiency of data access and use has a direct
relationship with the outcomes of the cooperative
process since it can facilitate or hinder collaborative
work.
(2) -e big data ability has two-sided influence on the
cooperative behavior. We found that similar big data
capabilities will enhance the firm’s willingness to
cooperate and partners’ higher learning ability will
reduce firm’s cooperative willingness. An implica-
tion of this finding is that enterprise should have
absorptive capacity to be able to benefit from co-
operative innovation, and cooperation should be
conducted with enterprises of the similar level of
ability to avoid opportunistic behavior. -is result is
in line with an organizational learning perspective
which focuses on absorptive capacity as the main
determinant of firms’ competitive advantages. In
other words, similar ability could strengthen the
cooperative willingness of both sides. In addition, the
model results confirm that enterprises’ investment in
intangible and tangible resources involved in big data
capabilities has a negative impact on their willing-
ness to cooperate.
7. Results Verification
Having analyzed the models, the researchers revisited S to
verify the results. -e CEO of S is very supportive of the
findings. Far too often, S been struggled to decide on how
best to choose suitable partners for cooperation or making
S E
AC
B
φ
μ
S E
AC
B
φ
μ
Figure 5: -e relationship between cooperative area and big data capacity.
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decisions to move forward. -e findings gained from the
model provided S with confidence and a basis for making the
right decisions.
-e problems faced by enterprise S are as follows: (1) it
has invested in some big data construction, but its big data
analysis ability is weak; (2) its learning and absorption ability
is at the average level of the industry; (3) it hopes to make up
for some of the previous big data investment through co-
operation, and the proportion of revenue sharing should not
be higher than 60%.
According to the data of S and relevant model as-
sumptions, we will verify the results obtained by model
analysis in this section. -e numerical setting is reduced
equably according to the actual situation of the enterprise
and rounded to the value. Since firm S belongs to the
computer hardware industry, big data technology greatly
improves innovation. Considering the sales volume of S and
its upstream manufacturers’ innovative products in the first
year, we set at T� 4.
7.1. For the BigDataCapability. Since there is a critical value
of learning capability, xs � 0.3 and xr � 0.3 are set
according to the condition of the equilibrium solution.
Given the Qs � 8, Qr � 4, cs � 41, and cr � 45. -e effort
made by both sides for cooperation is es � 20 and er � 25.
Given β � 0.4. Matlab is used to draw the influence of big
data capability on the probability of cooperation area
(Figure 6).
It can be seen from the figure that when the data capacity
of the partner is higher than 0.2, the cooperation probability
of both sides can maintain a high level, and the closer big
data capacity of both sides can maintain a higher probability
of cooperation. -is is consistent with the conclusion of
-eorem 5. When the big data capacity of the partner is very
low, S will choose not to cooperate and the probability of
cooperation decreases with the greater gap between the two
sides. In addition, we can find that the cooperation area
between the two parties is small, especially when the co-
operation partner has a higher capacity, and the area is
significantly reduced. Since both parties are SMEs, the
critical point of cooperation is small (e.g., 0.2). If both parties
are large enterprises, their cost, stock, and other data will be
higher, and the critical point may increase. In the actual
situation, firm S tried to negotiate with three enterprises and
finally reached an agreement with the partner whose data
capacity was basically in line with S (in terms of data stock,
data analysis of human resources and data validity).
7.2. For the Learning Capability. Set the parameters to
es � 20, er � 25, φ � 0.3, and μ � 0.4. Given the β � 0.4. We
can get the influence of learning capability on the probability
of cooperation area.
Figure 7 shows that there is a critical point in firm S’s
learning ability. When firm S’s learning capability is too
high, cooperation cannot be reached. However, in the fea-
sible region, the cooperation probability is very high and
decreases with the increase in the learning capability of the
other parties (but the change is very small), which is con-
sistent with the conclusion of-eorem 4. In addition, we can
see that xr can approach 1 because the xr expression given
in-eorem 4 is higher than 1 in this case. For firm S, its own
weakness lies in its low big data capability, so it needs to
cooperate with other partners. -erefore, no matter what
level of learning capability the partner has, the knowledge
that can be stolen from S is limited, and the best can only be
achieved through the efforts of both parties. -e critical
value of firm S is due to the uncertainty of the partner. If firm
S has too strong learning ability, the other party will not
choose to cooperate.
7.3. For the Distribution Coefficient. According to the above
analysis, we set the parameters to es � 20, er � 25, φ � 0.3,
μ � 0.4, xs � 0.3, and xr � 0.3. We can get the influence of
distribution coefficient on the probability of cooperation
area (Figure 8).
We can see that there is an optimal allocation ratio to
maximize the cooperation probability, which is consistent
with the conclusion of -eorem 6. When the distribution
coefficient is higher than 0.8, cooperation cannot be reached,
and when the cooperation probability is slightly lower than
0.8, it obviously increases. When the distribution coefficient
approaches 0.6, the cooperation probability is the highest,
which is also the negotiation space for firm S to negotiate
with other firms.
In light of enterprises S encountered problems, we can
give the following suggestions:
(1) Due to the high barriers entry, the absorption ca-
pacity of SME in the industry is generally lower, so
the partner selection should consider the learning
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Figure 6: -e influence of big data capability.
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ability cannot be higher than themselves; that is, the
cooperative enterprise’s technical personnel shall be
flat with the company.
(2) Because S has invested in big data, it has a certain
amount of data, and the data stock can be used as a
cooperation advantage, so it can gain certain dom-
inance in the profit sharing negotiation. Data
complementarity should be considered when
selecting partners.
(3) Considering the stability of cooperation and its own
weak big data capability, the selected partner’s big
data capability can be slightly higher than its own.
(4) Enterprise S has a limited budget for cooperative
investment, so it may invest less efforts in the co-
operation than the partner. -erefore, it can make
some concessions in profit sharing to encourage the
partner to increase investment.
8. Conclusions
8.1. Value of Research. Data resources have become an
important competitive factor for firms in the era of digital
economy. With the development of high technology, en-
terprises can have frequent contact with consumers through
a variety of channels, so as to have a deeper understanding of
market demand and a better understanding of consumer
behavior. -e data age has made it easier for companies to
use “big data” to accelerate product/service innovation.
However, the shortcomings of big data capabilities in firms
cannot be ignored (such as high cost of data storage, in-
sufficient data mining capability, and silo data, etc.) as it may
lead to unsuccessful product innovation. In other words,
firms do not innovate in isolation, at least not in an effective
way. -erefore, cooperative innovation is vital for firms to
sustain development and gain competitiveness.
On the other hand , the success rate of cooperative
innovation is not high. No matter whether there is market
competition between partners, data sharing makes firm lose
its unique right to data, and partners’ opportunism will
cause great losses to the sharing party. Cooperative inno-
vation entails the dualism of competition and cooperation;
i.e., the cooperative relationship tends to break down easily
as the spirit of fighting alone is still common in firms. Hence,
big data adoption and cooperation are vital for firms to
sustain competitive advantages. Specifically, the combina-
tion of big data and advanced analytics techniques (i.e., data
mining and machine learning) has big implication on in-
novation cooperation behaviors among firms.
-is paper adopted a mixed method approach (case
study-modelling-case study) to study firms’ co-opetition
behavior based on their data analytics capabilities for in-
novation. Our study suggests a number of very important
implications for managers of SMEs. One of the most im-
portant implications is that firms favor cooperation among
peers with similar capabilities; i.e., when each firm’s data
level is comparable to their partners. According to our re-
sults, similar big data capabilities will enhance the firm’s
willingness to cooperate, managers should also focus on
enhancing their internal capabilities such as big data ca-
pabilities and absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity en-
ables firms to capitalize on acquired knowledge. Firms with
high levels of absorptive capacity are more capable of uti-
lizing the acquired data knowledge to improve innovation
performance. Cooperation should be conducted with en-
terprises of the similar level of ability to maintain the sta-
bility of cooperation. -erefore, to be able to effectively
develop collaboration on innovation, managers should si-
multaneously develop collaboration with similar ability level
actors and improve their own capacity.
According to our results, the basic characteristics of big
data have a positive impact on the cooperative behavior. Big
data environment increases the possibility of cooperation.
Decisions based on massive amounts of data and high-value
data are more efficient, which improves the performance of
collaborative innovation. -e efficiency of data access and
use has a direct relationship with the outcomes of the co-
operative process since it can facilitate or hinder collabo-
rative work. On the other hand, managers should control
investment costs. Enterprises can make full use of the
complementary advantages of resources in the process of
cooperation and make use of the data resources of the other
party to reduce the input cost of big data in the innovation
process.
Moreover, our study demonstrates that the decisions of
participants must be the same. We explain the evolution
path of firms’ cooperation decisions and discuss the best
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options for them to sustain long-term growth and com-
petitiveness. One firm chooses cooperation, and the others
choose competition is in an unstable state; that is, the result
of system evolution is that both choose cooperation or both
choose competition. Firms can find the optimal distribution
ratio through negotiation and reach the final cooperation.
Finally, we give some suggestions based on the situation of
enterprises S, and it can also provide reference for SMEs in
the same industry.
8.2. Limitations and Future Directions. Big data brings new
and exciting opportunities and uncertainties for firms.
However, staying competitive will require firms to change
their innovation strategies. Even though some of the dis-
cussed trends is still at the role of big data in the innovation
process, this paper offers a few insights for the future.
We have demonstrated how the big data capability and
process can facilitate the cooperative innovation between
firms. However, the capability analysis was mainly based on
one parameter. -us, a much wider detailed factor analysis
of the big data analysis is needed to do. Moreover, different
industries will have different challenges in dealing with big
data. -us, future research can investigate what other big
data capacities are available for manufacturing firms to
sustain competitive advantages.
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